DoD's own military strategy university - Iraq war a debacle

Little surprised this hasn't got broader coverage (perhaps the "Iraq war has been a debacle" view is now an established consensus??).
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/homepage/story/34101.html

The DoD's own school of military strategy, chaired by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, calls the entire thing a massive balls-up and seem to be setting it up for use as a teaching example of "what not to do". Lays blame heavily at Rumsfeld's feet, alongside other senior administration figures.

They do raise this point though, which I agree with:
"Strong majorities of both Iraqis and Americans favor some sort of U.S. withdrawal. Intelligence analysts, however, remind us that the only thing worse than an Iraq with an American army may be an Iraq after a rapid withdrawal of that army."
AKA We fucked this up so badly, we need to get it back to a level of stability before we can, in good conscience, leave them to it...


Hat tip to Public Address...

did you miss the memo - Iraq isn't news anymore

The US should fuck off and leave the country to the Iranians... after all that seems to be the only thing they have accomplished with any degree of sucess

of course they won't be going anywhere until the oil wells are dry

Can we just get it over with and start referring to it as V2?
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..Vietnam II.. sounds heaps more apt considering that was one of the American public's initial big fears over invading Iraq.


R

did you miss the original memo - we're not allowed to compare iraq to nam

Interesting affirmation from these senior officials.

I think about the only thing that was well executed in this war (which I was against from the get go and remain proud of such) was the actual tactical invasion of Iraq and the taking (note not securing) of the major centers of the country in such a short time frame.

Everything else BEFORE (including the alleged evidence of WMD via US intelligence that was constantly reporting it was being bullied into exaggerating their reports) and AFTER the invasion has exposed the gross inadequacies of this Bush administrations planning, whether it be the post war security plan (um what plan?) or winning over the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Iraqi people by using such a sterile Neo Classical / Keynesian synthesis template for postwar construction (no mater how efficient I may praise it), without even including them? Speaks volumes about the lack of perspective on how it would be perceived and interpreted.

The only thing that seemed to have been done well (despite my constant amazement at people’s stupidity in believing it) was the pre-war propaganda of linking Iraq to Al Qaeda in the minds of the US public (and therefore 911).

Partial blame can most certainly be attributed to the notorious neoconservative think tanks in Washington, such as “The Project for A New American Century” of which some of this administration are members of and which greatly influenced these outcomes.

There were so many flaws in this war…. I continue to remain amazed.

aparently the State Dept (?) draw up detailed palns for the handling of iraq post invasion, that were ignored

it is all about the wild west... and one day in the future we may find out more about how the "botched" job was always on the cards as it suited certain peoples aims

I've been unable to link through to the actual report, but the gist of the coverage says that all they cared about was the low-man-numbers, shock-and-awe overthrowing of Saddam ("War A". Rumsfeld et al took over from the Joint Chiefs and seemingly ignored all advice that just maybe there were other things to think about, like "what then?" i.e. "War B"

1. People at the start said it was a flawed strategy. Hell more people said it was flawed than said it wasn't.
2. The DOD is not a monolith; part of the DOD produced this report, but it was not signed off by the SecDef therefore you can't say the DOD said it.
3. Nobody is saying it's perfect, but it's not getting worse - it may be getting better - and EVERYBODY KNOWS COIN TAKES TWENTY YEARS.
4. Thus the real problem is people with a conventional war mindset assuming that you can solve the problem in 5 years.
5. Iraq vs. Nam? Uhh? 57k American dead or casualties in roughly 5 years vs 4000 in 4 years? No comparison.

wrote a point by point answer, biggie ate it.

Basically vads, I'm not saying this is a DoD publication, I'm saying that their premier strategic education institute is a big deal and they're saying debacle. And I agree with your comments about 20yr COIN operations and short-termism - the problem is Rumsfeld et al took over operations from people who agreed with us and refused anything but an intensive, short-lived, low-man-power operation. Cue subsequent debacle...

How could this even be allowed as an institutional possibility when it seems so maniacally insane to let important war planning decisions be made by a small selection of unqualified politicians?

Generals, strategists, economists, disaster relief, gosh even theologians of the local regions religions advising of potential issues (like holy days) should have been advising, while they planned and tweaked the final war models.

They have risked their own troops lives using such a narrow "War A" template.

I mean, I even found it grossly insensitive allowing US troops to hoist up the American flag after the fall of Baghdad, let alone have Paul Bremner come on television and declare Iraq open for business?

hearts-and-minds?

Actually there is also a good reason not to always let generals run wars...

1. Wars are about politics. They aren't fought for their own ends.
2. Generals are RIDICULOUSLY risk averse. Winston Churchill basically had to club his generals over the head to get them to do anything. You let a General run it all and he will take 25 years to build up sufficient force to allow an "adequate ratio to ensure the success of the advance."

We can complain all we want, but as Clausewitz said "war is simple, but even the simplest thing in war is difficult." It's not like business. Mistakes happen.

It all came down to one simple, wrong guess: that the Iraqis would welcome liberation. If that had been right, then Rumsfeld right now would be praised as a genius who used just the right rapier to deal to Iraq rather than the bludgeon used back in 1991.

But it was WRONG. And sometimes, based on the evidence, we make the WRONG decision thinking it was the right one. Hindsight is 20/20. But given what Rumsfeld knew in early 2003, did he think the Iraqis would support liberation? Yes. A miscalculation that has had monstrous effects, but not deliberate evil!

Regardless I would have thought War was about planing for different potential scenarios. I.e. War Plan A, contingency Plan B, etc...

Configuring your entire war machine around one assumption that Iraqi's would welcome them as liberators seems inherently myopic.

Probably. But sometimes we aim for efficiency, not effectiveness. Just-in-time logistics, for examples.